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Fiscal decentralization (FD) means devolution of power and responsibilities of national 
(central), government towards sub-national (local), governments.
2  Attaining economic 
efficiency, equality and macroeconomic stability can be considered among the main issues of 
concern for FD.  As all these targets may not be simultaneously achieved, however, policy 
priorities provide guidance for the design of fiscal decentralization.  Macreoconomic stability 
concerns, for example, may inhibit the central government from devolving its fiscal tools to 
sub governments as local policy priorities may be in conflict with macroeconomic stability 
and other national goals. While economic growth and efficiency, on the one hand, and 
equality, on the other, are often considered to be mutually exclusive targets, Petchey (1993), 
argues that fiscal equalization can in fact enhance efficiency by correcting fiscal distortions 
associated with free migration”.
3  Nevertheless, the interconnections and/or trade-offs among 
these three targets necessitates great care with the process of decentralizing fiscal activities.  
Decentralization of fiscal activity can be in regards to i) expenditures and ii) revenues.  
For empirical purposes, FD can be measured, respectively, as:  i) local government spending 
in province i /total government spending in province i, and ii) local government revenues in 
province i /total government revenues in province i.  Since a correct measurement of the 
extent of fiscal decentralization must only take into account the decentralizable aspects of 
public spending, however, the exclusion of pure public goods, such as defense and social 
security, is important .
4  Based on these definitions, Neyapti (2003) states that, between 1970s 
and 1990s, Canada, Switzerland, Australia and United States got the highest ranks with 
                                                 
2 See Samuelson (1954) and Oates (1972) and Oates (2001) for pioneering research. 
3 Inefficiencies that arise from fiscally induced migration can be eliminated by fiscal equalization. (based on 
Sagbas and Bagdigen (2003), p. 18.)   
4 Education, being a public good with significant socio-economic externalities in a country like Turkey may also 
be considered to be one of those expenditure items that warrant central government action until a standard (such 
as national average) is achieved.     3
regards to expenditure decentralization, followed by Argentina, India, Pakistan and Brazil in 
the group of less developed countries.   
The literature on FD has recently started to offer studies on international experiences 
that suggest elements of successful FD, though optimal design issues are yet far from being 
conclusive and policy proposals are difficult to generalize.  Theoretically, because 
heterogeneity in the needs and wants renders decentralized provision of public goods to 
dominate a uniform provision, factors such as country size, ethnolinguistic diversification, 
measures of local accountability, among others, are all pointed out to affect the success of FD 
(see, for example, Panizza, 1999; Von Braun and Grote, 2000; Tanzi, 2000).  Nevertheless, 
panel studies have shown that the macroeconomic and development effects of FD are not 
unambiguous, although good institutional infrastructures are shown to help reap the positive 
benefits of FD.
5  Neyapti (2003) provides a survey of the literature on the effects of FD and 
the factors that influence its effectiveness.   
In view of the recently drafted legislations that aim to increase the power of local 
authorities with regard especially to their spending decisions, this study focuses on an 
important aspect of FD across the sub-national units of Turkey: equalization.  The literature 
on fiscal decentralization focuses on two main types of imbalances: i) between national and 
sub-national governments (vertical imbalances)
6 and ii) among the sub-national governments 
(horizontal imbalances).  Vertical imbalances mainly emanate from two sources: a) tax bases 
usually differ both across regions and between central and sub-national governments; b) given 
                                                 
5 While FD appears to affect poverty reduction and social capital positively; its effect on the quality of education 
and health is negative; and on growth and corruption are uncertain (see, for example, Treisman [2000], Fisman 
and Gatti, [2000] and de Mello [2000]).  The effects of FD on deficits and inflation rely on political stability and 
good governance for the first, and also on central bank independence for the second (Neyapti, 2003). 
6 Revenue sources, especially the commendable tax bases, available to national governments are most often 
greater than those available to sub-national governments.  According to OECD (2002), the main tax bases 
available to subnational governments in Europe are incomes (not the taxes on payroll or workforce), profits and 
capital and property taxes.     4
a tax base, the capacity of tax collection, including tax effort
7, may differ both across regions 
and between sub-national and national governments.   
Even though factors such as scale and administrative capacity favor central 
government against local governments with regards to local tax collection ability, ability of 
subnational governments to collect local taxes may dominate that of the center especially 
when those taxes are targeted for locally determined spending needs.  The outcomes of local 
spending are also better monitored if its costs are correctly signaled to tax payer-consumers, 
unlike in the case of grant-financed activities.  In addition, grant supported activities are more 
likely to be centrally determined than not and thus may not respond to local needs and 
preferences.  Moreover, subnational governments, unlike central governments, can be held 
directly accountable for the spending that is financed by locally collected revenues.  
Internalizing the costs of a spending activity (eg. user charging) that links local spending with 
local taxes, would thus contribute to both allocative efficiency and local accountability.  
Hence, improving local revenue capacity and FD may indeed be a factor that helps mitigate 
vertical imbalances.   
On the other hand, since decentralized spending and revenue collection decisions may 
heavily depend upon the extent and nature of local interest groups activity, one would expect 
that the more encompassing the dominant local interests the more efficient the revenue 
collection as well as the spending decisions.  The foregoing arguments indicate that the 
following issues must also be taken into account in analyzing the outcomes of FD 
experiences: i) that non-locally financed local fiscal activity may lead to wrong price signals 
                                                 
7 One way of measuring tax effort is:  (Revenue collection/ revenue base).      5
and fiscal illusion
8 and ii) that horizontal imbalances and within-region imbalances may be 
aggravated with decentralization.
9  
While the diversity of local preferences, economic circumstances and capacities, 
which can be more closely observed by local than central governments justifies FD, the 
objective of eliminating or reducing vertical imbalances need to be taken into account along 
with the aim of reducing horizontal imbalances in the process.  In this paper, we refer to the 
attempt of achieving this joint objective as fiscal equalization (FE).  Hence, in this study we 
first analyze of the extent of vertical and horizontal imbalances, and then propose a 
mechanism for fiscal equalization.   
Since a just distribution of wealth, or achieving socio-economic equality, across and 
within the regions of a country can itself be considered a pure public good with great 
externalities, eliminating or reducing horizontal imbalances is essentially the responsibility of 
the central government.  The main tool for performing this responsibility, fiscal equalization, 
are intergovernmental transfers, which are mainly in the form of grants and revenue-sharing.  
In Turkey, revenue sharing method, supplying about half of municipal revenues, is simple, 
since it is mainly based on the population criteria.  Nevertheless, it is argued that this method 
is neither equality-enhancing (due to the derivation principle
10) nor transparent (due to mostly 
discretionary deduction practice) as it may seem.  Grants, on the other hand, are relatively 
insignificant and rather discretionary as well.
11   
Indeed, eliminating or reducing horizontal imbalances is an extremely challenging 
task; budgetary allocations to local governments may work against their intended purposes by 
                                                 
8 Fiscal illusion arises from the fact that while a local public spending benefits only a local public, its funding 
usually is obtained from the general public (see, Von Hagen and Harden, 1995).  
9 If revenues are mostly decentralized and revenue-sharing is reduced, richer regions will have more to spend, 
locking the poorer regions into lower spending capacities. 
10 ‘origin–based revenue principle’ where the amount of central taxes collected from an area determining the 
additional revenue share for that area.  This was introduced by the Law Number 3030 in 1984 to provide 
additional revenue sharing to metropolitan municipalities; with this law, metropolitan municipalities were 
entitled to receive 5% of all the national taxes collected at the headquarters of the province in which they are 
located. (Sagbas and Bagdigen, 2003: 109).   
11 Sagbas (2003)   6
increasing incentives to spend and lowering incentives to tax, and thereby hindering fiscal 
discipline in relatively less advantaged regions.  Hence, equalizing while decentralizating 
requires prudent monitoring and reinforcement mechanisms as well.  Allocation of shared 
revenues needs to abide by a rule-based mechanism, with necessary monitoring arrangements, 
geared to eliminating both vertical and horizontal imbalances.  Such a well-designed 
mechanism could impose a quasi-hard-budget constraint on subnational governments.  This, 
in turn, would have potential consequences of improved governance, reduced poverty and 
regional development, elements that could also facilitate the success of FD with regards to its 
other objectives.   Hence, FE can be treated as a disciplining device for FD and is therefore 
complementary to FD.   
In designing an equality-enhancing revenue sharing mechanism, the initial step is 
naturally to measure socio-economic disparities as well as vertical imbalances across sub-
national divisions.  As this study focuses on fiscal equalization outcomes of fiscal 
decentralization, we need to investigate not only local expenditure needs and revenue 
collection capacities, but also how the central government could best allocate resources in 
financing fiscal imbalances across the subnational units while addressing the horizontal 
imbalances as well.  Conceding that this is a rather complex and challenging task, this paper 
can be considered as a preliminary attempt to address the issue.   
In view of the forgoing discussions and the relevant literature, this paper proposes a 
method of redistribution for Turkey that is based on the measures of vertical and horizontal 
imbalances across the provinces.  The data in the current study belongs to the year 2000, and 
the proposed methodology needs to be repeated every year to incorporate changing 
conditions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly covers methodological 
issues.  Section 3 reports the various measures of vertical and horizontal imbalances across   7
the Turkish Provinces.  Section 4 analyzes the relationship between vertical and horizontal 
imbalances in Turkey.  Section 5 concludes.    
2. Methodology 
A World Bank survey of equalization practices via fiscal decentralization investigates 
the measurement of both fiscal capacity and expenditure need in individual sub-national 
units.
12  Expenditure needs are proposed to be determined by legally obligated types of 
services, local costs and prices and demographic factors.  The proposed method of measuring 
the revenue collection capacity
13 is based on personal income or GDP of a given sub-national 
unit.  “A composite income index” where weights are assigned according to the types of 
incomes constituting the local tax base is a modified version of this method.
14   
An alternative approach is the regression of local expenditures (revenues) on socio-
economic variables.  Sagbas (2003) constructs regression models to investigate disparities 
across local units in Turkey with respect to both expenditure need and taxation capacity.  
                                                 
12 Both Ma (1997) and Yilmaz and Bindebir (2003) report the details of  intergovernmental transfer  
systems in various industrial and developing countries.  Below, are the characteristics of four classifications of 
fiscal transfer systems that emerge from Ma (1997)’s study of nine countries.  
In countries like Australia, Germany, Japan, Korea and United Kingdom, transfers are made on the 
basis of both equalization of fiscal capacities (R) and expenditure needs (E) across regions (Formula A).  
According to this method, once E and C are measured
12, the government fills the gap: TRi = Ei-Ri , where i 
denotes the region.  However, since the available pool of transfers may be different than the total of such 
entitlements, actual transfers (ATR) are calculated as: ATRi = (TT/Σ TRi)*TRi ,  where TT is the actual pool of 
transfers.  Variations of this method can also be implemented by either selecting a fraction of the difference (Ei-
Ri) to be financed in transfers along with some discretionary part (OTR); or applying the formula after allowing 
for some standard level of transfers (ST) across the regions: TRi = STi +(Ei-Ri) +OTRi . 
  The second formula (Formula B) only considers equalization of fiscal capacities, an example of which 
can be found in Canada.  The formula assumes the same expenditure need across the regions, and aims to 
eliminate the deviation of regional tax collection from the national average.   By contrast, the third transfer 
method (Formula C) only considers equalizing expenditure needs, without emphasis on fiscal capacity due to 
difficulties in its measurement.  To measure fiscal needs, a weighted average of various socio-economic and 
demographic indicators are used.  India, Italy and Spain are examples to this type of fiscal transfer system.   
The final classification (Formula D) of fiscal transfer methods entails the equalization of transfers only 
on the per capita basis.  While Turkey is one example to the use of this formula, Germany, Canada, England and 
India also use it in certain types of transfers. 
  As Ma(1997) points out, the most advanced fiscal transfer formula is the first one (Formula A) in that it 
address both vertical and horizontal inequalities in the most effective way.  In terms of data requirements, 
however, it is also the most demanding one.   
13 Based on Sagbas (2003), who also lists the potential pros and cons of these methods. 
14 An alternative, representative tax system is based on the assessment of relative revenue-raising abilities of 
subnational governments.  This system is non-operative for Turkey due to its uniform tax rates and unavailability 
of local tax base information.   8
Both models include the following explanatory variables: population (pop); population 
density (den); age dependency ratio (adr) ; urbanization rate (urb); per capita income and 
corporation tax (ict) ; per capita local GDP (GDP); number of employees in industrial, 
financial and commercial sectors (emp) and a dummy for municipalities that are tourism or 
commercial centers (dum).  The expenditure function thus estimated is in effect a demand 
function.  Sagbas observes that the variables that affect tax collection are gdp (only for non-
metropolitian areas), ict, emp and dum, adr and urb, where the first four effects are positive 
and the last two are negative and significant.  In the estimation of expenditure demand, the 
effects of pop and adr are negative and ict and emp (both only for <10,000) are positive and 
significant.  These statistically significant findings are indicative of the inefficiency of using 
population as the only redistributive criteria in Turkey.
15   
The use of the regression analysis outlined above, especially if further relevant 
variables are considered, however, is mitigated by possible estimation problems.  Among such 
problems, the most obvious one being multicollinearity, should caution against the use the 
resulting coefficients as the specific weights in a redistribution function.  Rather, such 
regression results should indicate which variables are relevant for generating fiscal 
discrepancies.   
Ma (1997) indicates that, selection of region–based indicators to measure fiscal needs 
require careful simulations and consultations with regional authorities.  Notwithstanding this 
warning, we suggest that the principal components analysis
16 could be a superior approach to 
ascertain the weights for the relevant variables to measure the expenditure needs and revenue 
collection capacities.  Various educational, social and macroeconomic indicators can be 
                                                 
15 Non-tax revenues, though much less significant than tax revenues of municipalities across the country, may 
also be incorporated in devising a formula to close regional disparities.  Sagbas proposes equalization of non-tax 
revenues only on the basis of deviations from national averages of population and GDP per capita. 
16 Principle component analysis is the extraction of some linear combination of the columns of an X matrix (each 
corresponding to different variables) such as: z= Xc that provides the best fit to all the columns of X (see, for 
example, Greene, 1993).   9
considered among the factors whose variation across the provinces may play a role in both 
determining expenditure needs (E) and revenue raising capacities (R).  One should note 
however, that while some factors, such as sectoral potentials, may help explain the differences 
in E and R across the provinces they need not be the variables per se that define horizontal 
imbalances that needs to be eliminated, a point we will revisit later in this paper.   
In addition, at the central government level, how the local fiscal gaps are closed 
remains to be a policy decision that depends on the size of the pool and budget position.  
Revenue sharing and grant decisions, both of which could be open- or close-ended, must 
follow transparent but buoyant rules so as to achieve efficiency and accountability.  Ma 
(1997), for example, suggests that the transfers should be based on the formula: 
 TRi =( Êi –  )– OTR i R ˆ
i     
subject to the constraint that  
Σ(TRi) = pool of revenues (TR)   
where TR is transfers; (Êi – ) is the difference between “potential” expenditure needs and 
revenue collection capacity; and OTR is “other transfers”.  A possible way to formulize OTR 
is to treat it both as carrot and stick, in the sense that it can be used as a device both to 
penalize the local governments that do not make improvements with regards to their vertical 
and horizontal positions, and to help them to achieve the national standards in case of a 
“justified need” for it.  In case Σ(TR
i R ˆ
i) exceeds TR, then ATRi = TRi [TR/Σ(TRi)] becomes the 
actual level of transfers.  Many countries use a mixed formula of grants and revenue sharing 
based on different sets of fiscal indicators (see Ma, 1997).   
For the implementation of the above suggestions, while bestowing subnational 
governments with accountability, fiscal distances related with discrepancies in the socio-
economic factors must be closely monitored and made transparent.  To avoid adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems that may arise in the process, an advisory body for Fiscal   10
Equalization (call it, Fiscal Equalization Board: FEB
17) can be proposed as a body in charge 
of this duty.
18  FEB can be considered as a means of institutionalizing FE, as institutions are 
not only rules and regulations but also the enforcement mechanisms (see, for example, North, 
1986).     
As for transparency, the redistributive function designed by the principle component 
analysis may be a limited one due to its complexity, in the sense that although the factors that 
go into the analysis and the methodology of the analysis may be made public, the exact 
weights of individual factors obtained in the principal component analysis need not be 
revealed. This deliberate half-transparency could serve to reduce the possibility of adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems.  For example, if education has a large weight in 
determining expenditure means and/or revenue capacities, a local government may mainly 
focus on education to receive its reward, while may ignore the other socio-economic 
developments.  The stick can then be the penalties that can be devised in relation to the 
growing size of deviations in other indicators of socio-economic sort.    
As an additional implementation issue, Ma (1997) proposes that obtaining political 
support for the newly devised program would require a gradual, rather than all at once, 
adoption, while the population-based system is phased down over time by, say, initially fixing 
the nominal amounts of transfers. 
 
3.  Fiscal Status and Socio-Economic Standing of Turkish Provinces 
 
In this section, we present the relative status of Turkish provinces with regards to both 
fiscal and socio-economic indicators.  To do this, we first form the indicators of vertical 
imbalances across the 81 provinces of Turkey and inspect their relative positions (Section 
                                                 
17 In Turkish: Mali Esitleme Kurulu: MEK. 
18 Examples to such institutions are Commonwealth Grants Commission of Australia; State Finance Commission 
in India and Uganda Local Governments Finance Commission (see Yilmaz and Bindebir, p. 21)   11
3.1).  Next, to ascertain the extent of horizontal imbalances across the provinces, we 
compose indices of macroeconomic, education, other social indicators (Section 3.2).  Using 
these, we then analyze whether these indicators and fiscal variables have any connection with 
each other in Section 4.   
3.1.  Measures of Vertical Imbalance (VI) 
We consider three measures of vertical imbalance (VI):  i) the ratio of provincial 
expenditures to total provincial revenues (VI1); ii) the ratio of provincial expenditures to own 
revenues (VI2); and iii) the ratio of provincial expenditures to revenues received in the form 
of shared taxes (VI3).  All the provincial data used in the following analysis are based on the 
aggregates of municipal and special provincial administrations.   
Across the provinces, the average of VI1 is 0.98, indicating that, on average, 
expenditures are almost equal to the total provincial revenues, inclusive of shared tax 
revenues.
19  This is not surprising since the Turkish budget reporting system is inclusive of 
the financing of the deficits.  When VI is measured according to the second definition, the 
average turns out to be 1.69, meaning that expenditures of provinces are, on average, higher 
than revenues exclusive of shared taxes.  As for the third type of VI measure, the average is 
naturally much larger: 2.65, which indicates the importance of own revenue sources of 
provinces in total revenues.   
Figures 1a to 1c below show the frequency distribution of the ratios of these three 
measures of VI to their respective averages across the provinces.  Hence, the way to read the 
graphs is as follows: when a city falls within the range of 0,75 and 1,25, the vertical 
imbalance it incurs is within one quartile of the average measure of VI.  According to this 
interpretation, Figure 1a reveals that there are only 3 cities that fall out of that range of VI1, 
                                                 
19 Revenues of provinces are composed of tax  (inclusive of shared taxes) and non tax revenues and aid and 
funds (State Statistical Institute databases).    12
which indicates a rather equal distribution of VI1 across the provinces of Turkey.  
Furthermore, Figure 1a also shows that while only 1 province incurs more than 25% more of  
the average VI1, 2 cities incur at least 25% less than the average figure.  The rest of the 
provinces are all within the 25% vicinity of the average figure.     
 
Figure 1a: Distribution of VI1 Across Provinces 
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A similar picture is observed in Figure 1b: based on the measure of VI2, 11 cities 
provinces exceed the average ratio by more than 25%, while there are 9 provinces that exhibit 
less than 25% of the average measure of VI2.   
Like VI1 and VI2, VI3 also exhibits a rather concentrated distribution of VI across the 
provinces.  However, the lower and upper tails of the distribution in this case indicates a 
greater variation in the distribution of shared taxes; there are 17 provinces that incur at least 
25% less than the average of VI3 whereas 10 provinces incur more than 25% of the average 
figure.      13
Figure 1b: Distribution of VI2 Across Provinces    
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Reading from Figures 1a to 1c, it is possible to argue that, though not the vertical 
imbalances, per capita shared revenues are rather unevenly distributed across the provinces.  
To be able to interpret this point, we next look at the financing of these imbalances (VI2) via 
the main transfer system in Turkey: shared tax revenues.  Figure 1d shows the distribution of 
the ratio of shared revenues to own revenues across provinces.    14
Figure 1c: Distribution of VI3 Across Provinces 
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According to Figure 1d, while only 2 cities (Agri and Ardahan) receive shared 
revenues by less than half of their own revenues, 9 cities receive shared taxes by more than 
one and a half fold of their own revenues.  Specifically, the data indicates this ratio is more 
than two-fold in Kocaeli, Yalova, Istanbul, Ankara and Sakarya.
20   
                                                 
20 It needs to be noted, however, Kocaeli, Yalova, Sakarya, Duzce and Bolu have suffered from the 
1999 earthquake and hence they received unusually high transfers in 2000. 
   15
Figure 1d: Distribution of the ratio of Shared Revenues to Own Revenues 
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Based on the above observations, there appears to be room for a more even 
distribution of shared revenues so as to possibly obtain more desirable economic outcomes 
across the provinces as well as for the macroeconomy.  Indeed, Figure 1e shows that, even 
though population is the basis of shared revenue distribution, per capita shared revenues are 
also widely dispersed across the provinces of Turkey, induced possibly by the derivation 
principle and the lack of transparency with regards to the finances of local units, such as in the 
form of discretionary deduction practices.        16
Figure 1e: Distribution of per capita Shared Revenues  
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In an attempt to design an equitable redistributive formula of the revenue pool, in the 
next section we turn to the analysis of the relative positions of provinces with regards to 
socio-economic status, namely the horizontal imbalances.  By doing this, we not only intend 
to capture the major aspects of socio-economic discrepancies across the provinces in Turkey, 
but also use those discrepancies to devise an egalitarian system of transfers.      
   17
3.2.   Measures of Horizontal Imbalances: Socio-economic status 
To investigate the discrepancies across provinces, we consider three clusters of socio-
economic indicators as measures of horizontal imbalances: social, educational and 
macroeconomic.  The following four indicators form and index of education as a separate 
cluster (EDUC): teacher to student ratio in both primary and high schools, and female 
schooling rate in both primary and high plus vocational schools.  To form an index of social 
indicators (SOCIAL), other than education, we take into account the following eleven 
indicators: human development and poverty indices
21; the ratio of villages and subsettlements 
with sufficient water; doctor per population; urbanization rate; population density; ratio of 
green card holders
22; infant mortality rate; percentage of asphalt road; private car ownership 
(per 10 000 people) and electricity consumption (KWh per capita).  Next, we use the 
following five variables to form an index of macroeconomic status (MACRO): GDP per 
capita; (the inverse of) the share of agricultural value added in GDP; bank deposits per capita 
(as an indicator of access to financial markets); ratio of wage earners; and a dummy for 
provinces with development priorities (KOY).  The reason to include the share of agricultural 
value added in GDP in the Macro cluster is that agricultural sector is both more difficult to tax 
and monitor and is also subject to climatic conditions, all of which may pose fiscal difficulties 
in regions where this ratio is large.  The similar argument goes for the inclusion of the ratio of 
wage earners.    
All the data mentioned are obtained from the web site of the State Statistical Institute 
(unless otherwise indicated) for the year 2000, which is the most recent year for which the 
majority of the data were available.  Hence, because there are numerous indicators (20 of 
them) of social and economic performance, which are all likely to be highly correlated with 
                                                 
21 obtained from United Nations (2004). 
22 the rate of use of unemployment insurance.   18
each other, we apply principle components analysis
23 rather than reporting each indicator 
individually across the provinces; this leads us to obtain their summary indices that are easier 
to report and digest.  Principle components analysis enables us to focus on the clusters of 
information, rather than various individual indicators that may indeed be highly correlated 
with each other.  To form the principle components, all the indicators listed above are 
adjusted for their scale differences by using logarithms when needed.   
The results of the principle component (PC) analysis reveal that if we use the first PC 
as one composite index for each of the MACRO and SOCIAL clusters, we would be able to 
account for 59 % and 49% of the overall variability that could be explained by the 5 and 11 
variables listed above for the two cluster of variables, respectively.  Considering that the first 
principle components of both Macro and Social clusters carries such large proportion of 
information contained in the list of 16 variables, below we choose to report the relative 
positions of provinces based on these information only.  As for education, even though the 
first principle component carries only the 38% of the variability in all of the four variables 
listed above
24, for consistency in exposition, we again report the results based on the first 
principle component of Educ below. 
Hence, Figures 2a to 2c show the distribution of first principle component of each 
three clusters of socio-economic indicators.  The figures indicate that all clusters of indicators 
demonstrate a quite uneven socio-economic status across the provinces, and social index 
(Figure 2c) is the most widely spread cluster across the provinces, followed by 
macroeconomic performance index.   
It is interesting to observe in Figure 2b that education appears to be the most equally 
distributed attribute of socio-economic status across the provinces, while Tekirdag, Kocaeli, 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Greene, 1993, pp. 271-73. 
24 The first principle component of this cluster is correlated with the female primary and secondary schooling 
rates with more than 84%; with 20% with teacher to student ratio in primary school; and with 7% with the 
teacher to student ratio in secondary school.  Hence, it mostly accounts for the female schooling rate.   19
Yalova and Bilecik rank at the bottom of the distribution, Ankara and Kastamonu depict about 
four-fold the average education performance.  Overall, of the 81 cities, while 14 stand out on 
the upper tail of the distribution, majority of the cities (52 of them) are positioned in the 
center of the distribution and 15 are in the lower tail. 
 
Figure 2:  Distribution of the Indices of Socio-Economic Indicators  
Figure 2a:  Distribution of the Index (First Principle Components) of Macroeconomic  
          Performance 
 
                 
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
   Bayburt  Bartın Tunceli  Uşak  İzmir Ankara  İstanbul    
   Ş.Urfa Erzincan  Afyon Samsun  Adana  Kocaeli       
   Gümüşhane Çankırı K ırıkkale Hatay  Bolu  Yalova       
   Hakkari  Osmaniye Artvin  Sakarya  Muğla Bursa      
   Bingöl  K.Maraş Niğde Burdur Bilecik  İçel      
   Van  Diyarbakır Giresun Isparta  Denizli  Eskişehir      
    Ardahan  Erzurum    Aksaray  Nevşehir Antalya Tekirdağ      
   Bitlis  Iğdır Sinop  Düzce Edirne  Kırklareli      
   A ğrı Batman  Kilis  Zonguldak  Aydın      
   Muş Tokat  Elazığ  Çanakkale  Manisa       
      Mardin  Çorum  Karaman  Kayseri       
     Kars  Amasya  Kırşehir  Karabük       
     Yozgat  Ordu  Trabzon  Balıkesir       
     Adıyaman KastamonuKütahya  Gaziantep       
     Şırnak  Malatya  Konya        
      Siirt    Rize        
         Sivas          20
Figure 2b:  Distribution of the Index (First Principle Component) of Educational Status 
 
              
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
   Tekirdağ Hakkari Eskişehir Ankara   
   Kocaeli Bitlis TrabzonKastamonu   
    Yalova Batman Bolu    
   Bilecik Niğde Sinop    
    Siirt Artvin    
    Gaziantep Antalya    
    Hatay Tunceli    
   Şırnak Balıkesir    
   Mardin Aydın   
   Muş Muğla    
   A ğrı Samsun    
   Burdur    
 
We also constructed principle components of all the clusters combined, finding out  
that the first principle component of all the socio-economic indicators accounts for 42% of all 
the variability in them
25.  Figure 2d depicts the distribution of this index (first principle 
component) of the 20 socio-economic indicators formerly clustered as Educ, Social and 
Macro.  Figure 2d, as an overall index of socio-economic status, also reveals a wide 
dispersion across the provinces of Turkey.  In view of such large discrepancies, one may 
easily conclude that it is not very meaningful to only focus on a population-based system of 
distribution of the revenue pool as does the current system.  Rather, an egalitarian system of 
                                                 
25 The first 4 of these principle components account for about 69 % of the variation in the 20 indicators discussed 
above.    21
redistribution needs to addresses these wide divergences in socio-economic conditions across 
the provinces.  It is highly likely that both E and R would differ across the provinces that 
display different socio-economic status.   
 
Figure 2c:  Distribution of the Index (First Principle Component) of Social Status 
 
                 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
  Gümüşhane Sinop  Kırıkkale  İçel Denizli  Kocaeli    
  Mardin  Tokat  Karabük  Uşak Çanakkale  İzmir    
  Kars  Rize  Aksaray  Hatay  Bolu  İstanbul      
  Siirt  Erzurum  Çorum  Kütahya  Balıkesir Ankara    
  I ğdır Çankırı Sivas  Karaman  Isparta  Bursa     
  Van  Yozgat  Kilis  Bartın Aydın Tekirdağ    
  Ardahan  Erzincan  Kastamonu  Kırşehir Kayseri  Bilecik     
  Batman  Bayburt  Artvin  Niğde Burdur  Eskişehir    
  Diyarbakır Adıyaman Malatya Afyon  Adana  Muğla    
  Tunceli  Ordu  K.Maraş Samsun  Konya  Kırklareli    
  Şırnak  Ş.Urfa Trabzon Amasya  Nevşehir Sakarya     
  Muş Giresun    Gaziantep  Manisa  Edirne     
  Bitlis     Elazığ Zonguldak  Antalya     
  Bingöl            
  Hakkari            
  A ğrı            
 
An interesting observation substantiating this argument, for example, is that, Istanbul, 
Ankara and Kocaeli, for example, that turn out to be the outliers on the upper tail of the   22
distribution according to various measures of VI and according to the ratio of shared tax 
revenues to own revenues (see Figures 1a, 1b and 1d), also turn out to be in the upper tail of 
the distribution with respect to socio-economic indicators (see Figure 2d).   
 
Figure 2d: Distribution of the Overall Index (First Principle Component) of Socio-Economic   
      Status 
 
             
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
  
 
I II III IV V VI  
  A ğrı Adıyaman   Balıkesir  İzmir  İstanbul    
     Ş.Urfa   Aydın Eskişehir Ankara   
   Batman   Sakarya  İçel Kocaeli   
   Yozgat   Manisa  Tekirdağ Bursa   
   D i y a r b a k ır   Çanakkale Kırklareli    
   Bayburt   Kayseri  Muğla    
   Siirt   Samsun  Bilecik    
   K a r s    U şak Antalya     
   G ü m ü şhane  Zonguldak Edirne    
   I ğdır   Isparta  Denizli    
   Van   Burdur  Bolu    
   Şırnak Karabük  Adana     
   Ardahan   Gaziantep    
   H a k k a r i    H a t a y      
   Bitlis   Konya     
   Bingöl   Nevşehir     
   M u ş   K ırıkkale     
      Kütahya     
      E l a z ığ     
      K ırşehir     
      K a r a m a n        23
  Based on the distribution emerging in Figure 2d, we next look at average values of the 
fiscal indicators across different, though somewhat superficially determined, socio-economic 
groupings of the provinces.  Table 1 clearly indicates that as socio economic performance 
improves (going from column 1 to VI), there are accompanying increases in expenditures, 
own revenue collection, and as mentioned above, interestingly, shared taxes per capita as 
well.  Table 1 thus shows that, across the provinces, the improvements in the budgetary 
positions due to relatively better socio-economic performance are not realized; all three of the 
VI measures, that are not notably different from each other across different socio-economic 
statuses point at this direction.    
 
Table 1:  Averages of fiscal indicators across provinces grouped by socio-economic  
performance index. 
AVERAGE: I II III IV V VI Overall
          
VI1  0.96 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.98
VI2  1.45 1.80 1.62 1.67 1.50 2.22 1.69
VI3  2.81 2.47 2.94 2.63 2.93 1.88 2.65
EXPpc  23.62 36.48 52.05 54.78 68.68 106.43 55.10
ownREVpc  15.96 11.60 21.16 24.18 35.54 38.88 34.42
sTAXpc  8.40 15.12 18.63 22.30 24.65 59.99 22.70
 
(Note: EXPpc is per capita expenditures; ownREVpc is total tax and non tax revenue minus  
share revenues; and sTAX pc is the shared per capita taxes.) 
 
4.  The relationship between socio-economic status and fiscal position 
This section investigates whether the discrepancies among the fiscal positions across 
the provinces are related with horizontal imbalances defined as divergences in their socio-
economic status.  In view of Table 1, it is predictable that the better the macroeconomic 
performance, education and social indicators, the larger the municipal revenues that can be 
collected.  It is also obvious that the better the socio-economic status, the more municipal 
spending has been taking place, thus leaving the implications with regards to the effect of 
socio-economic status on vertical imbalances ambiguous.  In what follows, we will attempt to   24
identify the provinces whose expenditure levels and own revenues diverge form the average 
levels implied by the relevant socio-economic status.  This way, we will be able to point at 
policy proposals for those provinces in the direction of either improving their revenue 
collection capacity or adjusting expenditures upward or downward.     
To address these points, we utilize our data efficiently by employing the first 4 
principle components of the total of 20 indicators (PC20) listed above under each cluster, 
which all together account for the 69% of all variation in the 20 variables.
26  In addition, we 
control for the cities that suffered from the 1999 earthquake by a dummy variable (D)
27.  
Moreover, even though we argue that the size of population or being a metropolitan 
municipality should not justify the divergence from the (average) levels estimated by the level 
of socio-economic status, we nevertheless add the (logarithm of) population (pop) and a 
dummy for metropolitan municipalities (MM) so as to account for the effects of these factors 
that may have already been affecting the local fiscal decisions in Turkey.  Hence, this analysis 
concentrates on the prevailing factors that effect E and R and thus attempts to identify 
divergences from the average practice.  The usefulness of this approach hence lays in 
identifying the major problem cases and helps to redirect the redistributive practices towards a 
more reasonable system of determining E and R that is based solely on socio-economic 
criteria, rather than by factors such as population which are likely to have been manipulated 
and used as a criterion of redistribution due to political concerns.  One should additionally 
note, however, that the 20 criteria proposed in this paper may be modified and extended under 
objective conditions.  
                                                 
26 Alternatively, we use the first three principle components of each of the three clusters of socio-economic 
indicators explained above: Educ, Social and Macro, accounting for about 70% to 90% of all variation that can 
be explained by the variables included in the respectively clusters.  Since the results are virtually the same as in 
the case of the principle components of all the 20 indicators taken together, with all clusters being significant 
except for education in own revenues.  For purposes of efficiency in estimation and simplicity, we only report 
the results with the 4 PCs formed on the basis of all 20 indicators, though the alternative estimations can be 
obtained from the author.  
27 Those cities are:Bolu (14), Kocaeli (41), Sakarya (54), Yalova (77) and Duzce (81), where the numbers in 
parentheses are the license numbers.   25
Hence, we estimate the following two models for expenditures and revenues, 
respectively:   
E= β0 + β1*PC201 + β2*PC202 + β3*PC203+β4PC204 +β5D+ β6MM + β7pop + e    (1)
R =  γ0 + γ1*PC201 + γ2*PC202 + γ3*PC203+γ4PC204+γ5D +γ6MM + γ7 pop + ε    (2) 
where the estimations are made with OLS method and White-heteroskedasticity correction 
has been performed to obtain consistent standard errors: e and ε, respectively.   
 
Table 2: OLS estimations of (logs of) E and R (per capita), using robust errors.  
         Dependent Variables:       
  Expenditures (E) Own Revenues (R)   
Explanatory variables:           
constant 114.76***  83.27**     
 (3.48)  (1.99)     
PC1 4.43***  2.86**     
 (7.98)  (7.22)     
PC2 2.10*  1.79**     
 (1.94)  (1.97)     
PC3 2.33*  0.68     
 (1.95)  (0.42)     
PC4 3.77  0.91     
 (3.55)  (0.80)     
Earthquake Dummy  28.77  3.15     
 (2.93)  (1.09)     
Population (in logs)  -4.83*  -4.68     
 (-1.95)  (-1.50)     
MM 12.12*  5.72     
   (2.06)  (1.20)     
R-bar square  0.66  0.31     
Nu. of obs.  78  78     
*** , ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The numbers in parentheses are the t-ratios. 
 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for per capita expenditures and per capita own 
revenues, the latter calculated as the sum of own tax revenues and non-tax revenues.  We 
argue what the estimation of the models above yields can be interpreted as the “revenue 
collection capacity” and “expenditure needs”, based on socio-economic status.  The first   26
column indicates that there is positive and significant relationship between the socio-
economic status and the expenditures of provinces.   
While we also observe a negative effect of population, being a metropolitan 
municipality leads to higher expenditures beyond the effects of socio-economic variables; 
both of these effects, however, are only significant at 10%.  While this reflects the current 
practice, however, we argue that last two effects may be eliminated overtime as factors that 
could affect expenditures are already taken into account in PC variables.
28  Indeed, we do not 
see the significant effect of either population or MM on the revenue collection capacity, 
whereas own revenues are positively and significantly associated with the first two principle 
components of socio-economic indicators.  We also observe that the model above has a much 
higher goodness of fit in case of expenditures than for revenues (column 1 as compared to 
column 2), which indicates that socio-economic conditions have not been as significant in 
determining the revenue collection capacity in Turkey as much as we consider it should.  
Moreover, the positively significant relationship between the PCs and E indicates the 
dominance of cases where more spending leading to good socio-economic status rather than 
bad socio-economic status leading to more spending.    
Based on the difference between the estimated expenditure needs and own revenue 
collection capacities, we can then calculate estimated transfers as:  
TRest = Eest – Rest    (3) 
 
where Eest and Rest represent the estimated values of E and R, respectively, following the 
models (1) and (2) above. 
Table 3 below utilizes the estimation results reported in Table 2 to rank the deviations 
of estimated transfers (TRest), implied by the difference between estimated expenditures and 
own revenues, from actual transfers, in the form of shared taxes, plus aid and fund.  
                                                 
28 When we estimate both of the models by excluding the last two terms, namely MM and pop, the goodness of 
fit are reduced to 0.63 and 0.29, respectively for E and R.   27
According to column (4) of the table, the sum of actual transfers (inclusive of aid and funds) 
exceeds the sum of implied amounts by 127 Million TL (per capita).  This also implies an 
average vertical imbalance (calculated as E/own revenues) of 2.58, which is slightly lower 
than the actual average level of 2.86.   
The tables demonstrates that especially Kirikkale, followed by Bilecik, Ankara, 
Cankiri, Kocaeli and Hakkari are listed at the top of the cities that receive much more than the 
average amount of transfers given their socio-economic status.  By contrast, Agri, Diyarbakir, 
Balikesir (from the bottom of the list) appear to receive less than the amount estimated by 
their socio-economic status.  It should be noted, however, that this analysis merely provides 
estimates and its results should not necessarily be viewed conclusive.     
 
   28
Table 3:  Ranking of Turkish Provinces according to the deviations of estimated transfers  



































































































































































   (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
    
71 Kırıkkale 43.47 40.35  30.60 53.21 40  Kırşehir 19.14 4.32 23.63 -0.17
11 Bilecik  25.46 32.13  31.05 26.54 66  Yozgat 14.32 10.06 24.62 -0.24
6 Ankara  61.67 10.15  47.75 24.06 70 Karaman  17.38 9.19 26.81 -0.25
18 Çankırı 22.90 26.80  25.85 23.84 8  Artvin  14.91 18.08 33.65 -0.65
41 Kocaeli  76.23 15.32  72.31 19.24 52  Ordu  17.22 10.20 28.50 -1.08
30 Hakkari  16.44 22.19  22.01 16.63 31 Hatay  19.53 6.24 26.95 -1.18
37 Kastamonu  16.19 35.31  39.61 11.89 33  İçel 27.95 10.69 39.97 -1.33
54 Sakarya  59.95 11.65  59.70 11.89 35  İzmir 37.55 5.45 44.41 -1.42
14 Bolu  31.30 36.61  56.96 10.95 38  Kayseri  24.99 9.00 35.41 -1.42
53 Rize  21.88 17.10  28.88 10.10 65 Van  13.41 9.01 24.54 -2.12
46 K.Maraş 19.59 16.38  26.27 9.70 15  Burdur  16.91 9.09 28.17 -2.16
5 Amasya  22.21 15.59  28.55 9.25 9  Aydın 17.60 11.75 31.70 -2.35
76 Iğdır 12.97 26.00  29.99 8.97 23  Elazığ 16.53 6.15 25.76 -3.08
34  İstanbul   71.71 5.36  68.39 8.68 58  Sivas 16.44 8.18 27.79 -3.17
57 Sinop  11.63 27.12  30.83 7.91 16  Bursa 30.34 8.53 42.80 -3.93
51 Niğde 19.10 13.66  25.04 7.72 45  Manisa  18.80 6.59 29.68 -4.30
13 Bitlis  16.21 14.14  22.90 7.45 67  Zonguldak 24.88 9.84 39.06 -4.34
32 Isparta  19.11 13.72  25.86 6.98 26  Eskişehir 28.57 8.07 41.08 -4.44
19 Çorum  16.58 17.01  26.70 6.89 42  Konya 21.42 6.71 32.82 -4.68
60 Tokat  21.60 7.97  23.80 5.77 12  Bingöl  15.76 4.79 25.25 -4.70
74 Bartın 13.45 27.85  35.67 5.63 64  Uşak 21.45 6.46 32.81 -4.91
49 Muş 17.91 7.77  20.30 5.39 20  Denizli  18.30 12.27 36.08 -5.52
25 Erzurum  27.73 10.17  32.67 5.23 72  Batman  13.61 7.59 26.76 -5.56
68   Aksaray  19.64 10.56  25.24 4.95 7 Antalya  23.41 9.98 39.52 -6.13
50 Nevşehir 17.92 16.04  29.11 4.85 47  Mardin  14.13 2.87 23.13 -6.14
24 Erzincan  20.80 8.98  25.22 4.55 55  Samsun  20.88 10.51 37.62 -6.23
79 Kilis  16.16 6.57  25.79 3.95 22  Edirne  17.03 9.31 32.65 -6.32
28 Giresun  15.19 17.04  28.42 3.81 2  Adıyaman 15.75 1.80 24.86 -7.30
29 Gümüşhane 14.37 12.43  23.33 3.47 36  Kars  12.13 2.81 24.01 -9.07
69 Bayburt  20.16 7.52  24.32 3.36 39  Kırklareli 17.83 3.57 31.81 -10.42
75 Ardahan  10.20 20.53  27.44 3.29 27  Gaziantep 18.89 6.85 36.23 -10.48
3 Afyon  21.51 8.45  26.84 3.11 59 Tekirdağ 17.47 6.04 34.29 -10.79
43 Kütahya  18.44 11.22  26.73 2.94 17  Çanakkale 13.58 5.44 30.68 -11.66
73  Şırnak 13.50 11.80  23.31 1.99 48  Muğla 15.12 10.03 37.13 -11.97
44 Malatya  21.01 7.86  27.18 1.69 62 Tunceli  14.93 na 27.48 -12.55
78 Karabük  20.07 13.58  32.00 1.65 10  Balıkesir 17.27 1.61 32.38 -13.49
61 Trabzon  23.65 11.25  33.41 1.50 21  Diyarbakır 16.57 7.93 39.41 -14.91
56 Siirt  17.47 7.79  23.91 1.35 4  Ağrı 8.40 0.28 25.15 -16.47
1  Adana  35.79 2.41  37.77 0.42       
63  Ş.Urfa 16.22 6.14  22.29 0.07 Total (Million TL): 1697.8 907.8 2478.7 126.9 
   29
Eliminating Horizontal Imbalances (HIs): 
   Up to this point, we only used HIs to identify the estimated (or justified) level of VI to 
be financed by transfers, without addressing the question of how to reduce or eliminate those 
HIs.  For purposes of equalization, however, we need to modify the above formula (3) to also 
incorporate a factor designed to reduce or eliminate HIs.  To do this, we consider a subset of 
socio-economic indicators that we think constitutes an objective set of criteria with respect to 
which all provinces are desired to converge.  For this, we end up with 11 criteria from the set 
of 20 indicators above: teacher to student ratio in both primary and high schools, and female 
schooling rate in both primary and high plus vocational schools; human development and 
poverty indices; the ratio of villages and subsettlements with sufficient water; doctor per 
population; infant mortality rate; percentage of asphalt road; and GDP per capita.
29  To this 
list of criteria, we also apply principle components analysis and find out that the first principle 
component (call it SE) accounts for the 38% of all the variability contained in the set of 11 
variables.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of SE across provinces, depicting a rather uneven 
picture. 
Using the first principle component, SE, of this set, we then calculate the distances of 
individual provinces (di) from the average SE value.  We consider this distance measure as 
another justification for providing provinces transfers in case the pool of actual transfers 
exceed the sum of above defined “estimated transfers”.  We utilize this variable in the 
following way to suggest a way to calculate equitable transfers: 
TR′ = di * (TR pool -Σi TRest  )     (4) 
                                                 
29 As was mentioned earlier for the set of 20 criteria that we hypothesized to affect E and R, this list of 11 
indicators are also subject to modification granted that the modification is based on objective reasoning.   30
where di is given by:  di = (SEmax– SEi )/ Σi(SEmax– SEi)  and i stands for each of the 
provinces.
30  Note that, if only formula (4) is taken into consideration, all transfers would be 
purely redistributive, collecting revenues from the richest provinces and allocating them to the 
poorest.  Figure 4 depicts this pure redistribution case.  
 
Figure 3:  Distribution of the distances of “socio-economic status” from national average 
         
 
            
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 Ardahan  Erzincan  Artvin Karabük  Bolu  Ankara 
 Mardin  K.Maraş Afyon  Konya  Aydın  İstanbul  
 Siirt  Sinop  Niğde Samsun  Çanakkale  İzmir 
 Batman  Gümüşhane Amasya  Uşak Denizli Kocaeli 
 Van  Tunceli  Malatya  Kırşehir Bilecik  Bursa 
 I ğdır Bayburt  Bartın Kilis  Burdur  Eskişehir 
 Diyarbakır Erzurum  Çorum  Nevşehir Sakarya  Muğla 
 Muş Yozgat  Gaziantep Hatay  Balıkesir Edirne 
 Bingöl  Giresun  Rize  Kırıkkale Manisa  Antalya 
 Bitlis  Adıyaman Trabzon Kütahya Isparta  Tekirdağ 
  Şırnak Ordu  Çankırı Zonguldak Adana  Kırklareli 
 Hakkari  Ş.Urfa Aksaray  Karaman  İçel  
 A ğrı Kastamonu  Sivas  Elazığ Kayseri  
  Kars  Tokat      
 
 
                                                 
30 This formulation gives the province with the lowest SE the highest weight, while the sum of all di’s add up to 
1.     31
Figure 4: Transfers in case of pure redistribution – According to Formula (4). 




































































































    (Note: numbers are the license numbers of each province) 
 
However, this formulation does not take into account the “estimated” level of  
transfers to each province that we suggest in formula (3).  Hence, we use (4) to modify (3) in 
the following way: 
TR*= TRest + TR′     (5) 
Formula (5) defines our proposed level of transfers that not only takes into account the 
estimated amount of transfers, based on the differences between estimated expenditure needs 
and revenue collection capacities, but also redistributes the remainder of the revenue pool (TR 
pool -Σi TRest), if a positive amount, with the weights calculated on the basis of distances to 
the best province in terms of SE.  In case, on the other hand, the sum of estimated transfers 
exceed the TR pool, then, the actual transfer amount can be adjusted by the formula: 
TRi  = (TResti / Σi TResti)* TR pool   32
Considering that the revenue pool (inclusive of aid and funds) exceeded the sum of 
estimated transfers in 2000 (see Table 3), we could indeed implement the modification 
suggested in Formula 5.  Figure 5 below shows the position of the actual transfers of each 
province vis a vis the amount suggested by formula (5), which is what we call “Proposed 
Transfers”: TR*. 
Figure 5: Proposed versus Actual Transfers -- according to formula (5) 
Proposed (according to Formula 5) Transfers versus 



















































































































































Since the redistributed part of the transfers according to formula (4) is rather small (127 
Million TL per capita), the rankings of the deviations of proposed figures from the actual ones 
depicted in Figure 5 are very similar to the ones already reported in Table 3 above, and hence 
we do not report them again here. 
Making Formula (5) Dynamic: 
The above analysis is a static one in the sense that for each period, transfers are  
determined based on some observation of the relevant factors, namely those listed under the 
clusters of EDUC, SOCIAL and MACRO and other idiosyncratic factors, such as natural 
disasters hitting certain areas.  Indeed, since many of these indicators change only slowly over   33
time, the estimation can be made in less than yearly frequencies, such as once in every four or 
five years.  A more relevant issue with regards to the dynamic aspect of the estimation, 
however, is in regards to formula (4) or the second portion of formula (5).  As this 
formulation should advocate for closing the HIs or reducing di’s, the impact of the transfers 
that are provided with this motivation needs to be closely monitored as reductions in di’s, 
should be rewarded, while increases should be penalized by means of a predetermined 
incentive mechanisms.  Such a mechanism needs to be transparent, and incentives may 
include debt-forgiveness or additional transfers.  Formula (6) is a modified version of 
Formula (5) that also incorporates such a factor:  
TRi** = TResti + dit * (TRpool -Σi TRest -A) + (DCFi)      (6) 
where A is a predetermined amount of funds out of the total revenue pool that is allocated for 
a “dynamic correction factor (DCF)” assigned specifically for reward or penalties.  Hence, 
DCFi = f (improvements in income distribution; cash/accrual; environmental    
 improvements; improvements with regards to governance)* A .    
where f′ is positive and thus means that in case of deteriorations, DCF can be negative as 
well.  Once again, it needs to be pointed out that the factors that constitute rewards and 
punishments may be a list that may differ from the ones mentioned above, but nevertheless 
must be objectively and transparently defined. 
  It is of utmost importance that such equalization mechanism is as free from political 
concerns as possible.  Therefore, institutionalization of the above system of redistribution may 
require an independent organization that may be called ”Fiscal Equalization Board” (FEB).  
The duties of FEB would include data collection and processing and advising the relevant 
government bodies regarding the allocation of transfers.  The transparency of such a system 
can be reinforced with public reports of FEB that could also provide a mechanism of 
enforcement.   34
5. Conclusions 
This study analyzes the issue of fiscal equalization, with an application to Turkey.  We 
define fiscal equalization as eliminating vertical imbalances (VI) by taking into account the 
horizontal imbalances (HI).  We argue that HI influences VI and hence an equitable transfer 
system need to consider such implied variation in VI.  Moreover, we argue that in addition to 
the attempt to reduce or eliminate VI, reducing or eliminating at least certain aspects HI is 
also a fiscal concern and need to be taken into consideration in designing a transfer 
mechanism.   
In view of the relevant literature and evidence provided by Turkish data, we propose 
such a mechanism and provide a preliminary empirical analysis that suggests the extent of 
divergences of a more equitable system than the current one that is solely based on the 
population criteria.  We also point out the need for an independent organization that could 
help institutionalize such a mechanism with respect to its implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement: “Fiscal Equalization Board”.     35
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